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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CO-VEST CORP., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff - Respondent 
vs. 
BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR 
d/b/a UTAH RANCHLANDS, 
Defendants - Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
No. 19334 
This is an appeal from a lower Court ruling deny-
ing defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment, which was 
sought on the basis that the parties entered an Accord and 
Satisfaction of the prior Judgment entered against defen-
dants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Fourth Judicial District Court, The Honorable 
'3eorge i::. Balliff presiding, ruled that defendants' Exhibit 
No. 1 (R., p. 20) was not prepared for the purpose of efo 
fecting a compromise and settlement of plaintiff's Judgment 
and that defendants were not, therefore, entitled to relief 
from Judgment. The Court ordered that the stay of proceed-
ings previously issued pursuant to the Writ of Execution be 
dissolved. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff - Respondent seeks to have the ruling of 
the lower Court affirmed so that it may proceed to enforce 
its Judgment against defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Respondent Co-Vest Corporation (Co-
Vest) controverts much of the Statement of Facts as put 
forth by Defendants - Appellants Boyd Corbett and Keith Gun 
d/b/a/ Utah Ranchlands (defendants) and therefore, sets 
forth its own Statement of Facts relevant to this appeal, as 
follows: 
Pursuant to a February 4, 1981 ruling of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Judgment was entered on 
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February 1 8, 1 981 , in favor of Co-Ve st and against defen-
dants. (R., pgs. 2 - 5). The Judgment having become final, 
collection activities were instituted by Co-Vest. (R., pg. 
60). On December 31, 1981, the parties, through their 
respective counsel, entered into a 
which provided that Co-Vest would 
$15,000.00 to be applied against the 
settlement agreement 
immediately receive 
Judgment, with the 
balance of the Judgment, including all accrued interest, to 
be due and payable on January 1, 1983. This settlement 
agreement is not part of the record on appeal but is refer-
red to at pages 33 and 60 of the record and on page 3 of 
Appellant's Brief. As part of that agreement, Co-Vest 
agreed to defer any collection efforts until after January 
1, 1983. During the period of deferral, partial Satisfac-
tions of Judgment were accorded to defendants by Co-Vest in 
order to enable defendants to transfer various parcels of 
property. ( R. , pg s • 3 5 - 3 6 , 6 0 - 6 1 ) . 
Defendants did not pay the balance of the Judg-
ment, including interest, on January 1, 1983, as they had 
agreed to do. (R., p. 34). Consequently, Co-Vest, through 
its attorney, attempted to execute 
property owned by defendant, Keith 
ShPriff' s Sale was scheduled with 
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against certain real 
Gurr, (Gurr), and a 
notice for March 1, 
1983. (R., p. 65). Gurr made repeated overtures to Co-
Vest • s counsel, Carman E. Kipp and Stephen F. Hutch in son, 
toward some sort of compromise of the amount owing by defen-
dants to Co-Vest, but such offers were uniformly rejected 
since the Judgment was secured by property upon which co-
Vest could execute and obtain funds sufficient to satisfy 
the entire amount owing. (R., p. 61). Two or three days 
prior to the Sheriff's Sale, Gurr contacted Co-Vest's co-
counsel, Stephen F. Hutchinson, requesting an opportunity to 
forestall the execution sale by paying the balance owed. 
Gurr asked Mr. Hutchinson what the balance owing was; Mr. 
Hutchinson responded that only a cursory examination of the 
file had been undertaken and estimated the balance to be a 
figure in excess of $35,000.00. (R., p. 65). Gurr agreed 
to deliver a check for $20,000.00 on February 28, 1983, and 
an additional check of $10,000.00 within five (5) days 
thereafter, if Mr. Hutchinson would issue a Partial Release 
of Judgment Lien on certain parcels of land so that the 
parcels might be sold to a third party and the proceeds 
therefrom applied to the balance owed to Co-Vest. ( R., P· 
65). 
On February 28, 1983, Gurr did deliver a check 1 
the amount of $20,000.00, which was acknowledged by Mr. 
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Hutchinson by the document which defendants refer to as 
Exhibit 1. (R., p. 20) (Hereafter referred to as "February 
28 document"). However, there was never any discussion 
between Gurr and Mr. Hutchinson to the effect that 
$35,000.00 was the actual balance owed or that Co-Vest would 
accept such amount in full and final settlement of the 
amount owing to Co-Vest. (R., p. 61, 66). 
Defendants filed a Motion for Relief From Judgment 
on the basis that the February 28 document effected an 
accord and satisfaction of the amount owing by defendants. 
The Fourth Judicial District Court denied this Motion, 
ruling that the February 28 document was not prepared for 
the purpose of effecting an accord and satisfaction. (R., 
p. 6) Defendants appeal that ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT RULING MUST BE AF:-
FIRMED UNLESS THERE IS NO REASONABL~ 
BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT. 
The lower Court proceeding consisted almost 
exclusively of the presentation of evidence and argument 
concerning the interpretation of the February 28 document. 
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Defendants argued that such document effected an accord and 
satisfaction of Co-Vest's Judgment against defendants. 
Defendants presented the testimony of Gurr to support their 
interpretation of the February 28 document. Co-Vest 
introduced two Affidavits to show that the document was not 
intended to effect an accord and satisfaction. 
After reviewing the evidence, the Fourth Judicial 
District Court found that the February 28 document "was not 
prepared for the purpose of effecting a compromise and 
settlement of the judgment of plaintiff in this matter, but 
was a receipt of a $20,000.00 payment in exchange for 
termination of a Sheriff's Sale and a release of forty (40) 
acres." (R.,p.6). 
Th is Court has long adherred to the basic 
principle of appellate review which provides that the ruling 
of the lower court must be affirmed unless there is no 
reasonable basis in the evidence to support it. In the Case 
of Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah, 1977), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
"The long-established rules of appellate 
review require this court to defer to the 
findings of the fact finder, rather than 
substitute our judgment therefor, and 
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such holds true unless 
mined as a matter of 
could reasonably find 
finder. 
it can be deter-
1 aw that no one 
as did the fact 
The rules also require us to view the 
evidence, including the fair inferences 
to be drawn therefrom, and all of the 
circumstances shown thereby, in the light 
most favorable to the successful party 
below." (footnotes omitted) Id. 710. 
More recently the Court reaffirmed the principle, stating: 
"The> findings and conclusions of the District Court must be 
affirmed unless there is no reasonable basis in the evidence 
to support them." Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512 
(Utah, 1980). 
The Affidavits submitted by Co-Vest in the lower 
Court proceeding provide a sufficiently reasonable basis to 
st1pport the ruling of the District Court. Based on the 
Rules of Appellate Review as specified above, the ruling of 
the District Court should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE FEBRUARY 28 DOCUMENT AND SURROUNDING 
CIRCUMSTANCES FAIL TO SHOW AN ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION. 
As defendants' Brief indicates, the case of 
Sugarhouse Finance Company v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah, 
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1980) sets forth the essential components of a valid accord 
and satisfaction as follows: 
1. A proper subject matter; 
2. Competent parties; 
3. An assent or meeting of the minds of the 
parties; 
4. A consideration given for the accord. 
As the evidence presented at the lower Court hearing demon-
strates, at least two of these elements are lacking in the 
instant case. 
The first component lacking is an assent or meet-
ing of the minds. In regard to this element, this Court has 
stated as follows: 
"To effect an accord and satisfaction, 
payment must result from declarations of 
such a clear nature as to assure that the 
parties are aware of the extent and scope 
of such agreement." Messick vs. PHD 
Trucking Service, Inc., 615 P.2d 1276 
(Utah, 1980). 
The record in this case discloses that such clarity of 
understanding between the parties was lacking. 
attorneys for Co-Vest never agreed or intended to enter an 
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accot:"d and satisfaction. (See Affidavits at R., pgs. 60 -
67). Fut:"thet:"mot:"e, the testimony of defendant Gut:"t:" indicates 
that the t:"equisite clat:"ity of undet:"standing to effect an 
accot:"d and satisfaction was lacking. At page 29 of the 
recot:"d, the following intet:"change occut:"t:"ed between Gut:"r and 
his attorney: 
"Q. And is the $35,000 figure, as you 
understood it, to be the final amount of 
the Judgment? 
A. Yes. In fact, when I got their 
[sic] , Steve had a lot of stuff out on 
his desk, and he was figuring up stuff on 
a yellow paper, and he come [sic] up with 
a figure around Thirty Three Thousand 
Dollat:"s that we owed." 
If, in fact, the correct figure were $33,000.00, as Mr. 
Gurr's testimony indicates, it would have been foolish 
indeed for him to agree to pay $35,000.00 in settlement of 
that amount. The requisite clear understanding as to the 
extent and scope of any alleged accord and satisfaction is 
obviously lacking here. 
Similarly lacking is the element of 
consideration. The debt involved in this action is a result 
l F a final Judgment entered against defendants. The amount 
was 1 iquidated and undisputable. In a similar case 
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involving a liquidated and non-contingent debt, this Court 
stated as follows: 
"The payment of a part of a debt (in 
situations such as the one at hand), does 
not discharge it, even though the debtor 
exacts a promise that it will do so. The 
debtor, by making part payment is doing 
nothing more than he is legally obligated 
to do; and, therefore, he gives the 
creditor no consideration for the promise 
that part payment will be accepted to 
discharge the entire debt." (footnotes 
omitted) Allen Howe Specialties Corp., 
v. U.S. Construction, Inc., 611 P.2d 705, 
710 (Utah, 1980). 
Defendants, upon paying part of the amount owing to Co-Vest, 
could not discharge their liability to pay the full amount, 
even if the February 28 document is held to be a promise by 
Co-Vest to accept partial payment as full and final 
settlement. 
Defendants argue, however, in Point IV of their 
Brief, that the consideration substitute of promissory 
estoppel should apply. This doctrine is inapplicable to the 
instant proceeding because no detriment has been incurred~ 
defendants. Defendants argue that they suffered some sort 
of detriment by reason of the accommodations extended 1 
them by Co-Vest. The truth is, however, that defendant~ 
-10-
were benefitted by the actions of Co-Vest. On the day the 
accommodations were extended to defendants, Co-Vest was 
prepared to go forth with a Sheriff's Sale, whereby it would 
have realized full payment of the amount of its Judgment 
against defendants. However, at the urging of Defendant 
Gurr, Co-Vest agreed to forestall the Sheriff's Sale so that 
other payment arrangements could be worked out. Rather than 
suffer any detriment, defendants were benefitted by such an 
arrangement. Therefore, promissory estoppel does not apply 
in this case. 
POINT I II 
SINCE THE FEBRUARY 28 DOCUMENT WAS AMBIG-
UOUS, INTRODUCTION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
WAS PROPER. 
Co-Vest agrees with the statement of defendants 
that extrinsic evidence should be allowed only if the 
instrument to be construed is unclear or unambiguous. 
However, the February 28 document is ambiguous on its 
face. The most the document purports to be is an 
cic knowl edgment. Nothing therein would indicate that the 
parties agreed upon anything. To conclude that this 
document in and of itself sets forth clearly the terms and 
-11-
understandings between the parties is ludicrous. The intro-
duction of extrinsic evidence to shed 1 ight on the meaning 
of this document was entirely proper. 
Defendants further argue that when the lower Cour~ 
allowed ex tr ins ic evidence, it should have interpreted the 
terms of the alleged agreement strictly against Co-VPst, 
who, through its attorney, drafted the document. Defendants 
cite the case of Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Bybee, 
306 P.2d 773 (Utah, 1957) in support of this proposition. 
However, that case is inapplicable to the situation involved 
in this case. In Continental, the Court held that where a 
party to a contract was both the attorney-draftsman of and 
party to the instrument, the proper construction of the 
instrument should be strictly against him. In the instant 
action, the attorney-draftsman is not a party to t~ 
instrument. The attorney was not signing in his individual 
capacity, but was signing in his capacity as counsel for Co-
Vest. The lower Court did not err in failing to interpre' 
the terms strictly against Co-Vest. 
-12-
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THE INTRODUCTION OF EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE WAS IMPROPER, DEFENDANTS FAILED 
TO OBJECT TO ITS INTRODUCTION AT THE 
LOWER COURT PROCEEDING AND MAY NOT RAISE 
THIS POINT ON APPEAL 
Defendants argue that the lower Court erred in 
allowing ex tr ins ic evidence to be considered in construing 
the terms of the February 28 document. However, defendants 
failed to object to the introduction of extrinsic evidence 
at the lower Court hearing. Furthermore, defendants 
themselves introduced extrinsic evidence to construe the 
terms of the document. 
Following the introduction of defendants' 
evidence, the following interchange occurred at the hearing: 
"The Court: All right. What did you 
want to do by way of your presentation, 
Mr. Hutchinson? 
Mr. Hutchinson: I think we would have 
some argument, but I think our Affidavits 
cover the evidentiary portion of our 
case. 
The Court: Do you have any objection to 
the Affidavits? 
Mr. Anderson: we have no object ion at 
all, your Honor. n (R.' pgs. 41, 42) 
-1 3-
This Court has ruled that when a party fails to 
object to the introduction of testimony in the lower Cour~ 
proceedings, that party is in no position to raise the 
matter on appeal for the first time. In Dugger v. Cox, 564 
P.2d 300 (Utah, 1977), the defendant contested the award of 
attorney's fees to plaintiff because of a lack of evidence 
submitted on the issue. The Court stated as follows: 
"The only evidence presented by plaintiff 
on this point was his personal testimony 
that $3,000.00 was a reasonable amount 
for attorney's fees. Cox failed to 
object to testimony of plaintiff (not a 
lawyer) and failed to cross-examine on 
this issue, and is in no position to 
raise the matter here for the first 
time." _!i., at p. 303. 
See also Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah, 19801 
("Defects curable at trial cannot be relied upon by a party 
if the trial court has had no opportunity to rule thereon.", 
Defendants, having failed to object to the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence as to the interpretation 
of the Feburary 28 document, are precluded from raising thi, 
issue for the first time on appeal, particularly s1n·e 
defendants introduced their own extrinsic evidence. 
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POINT V 
SINCE NO ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS 
SHOWN BY DEFENDANTS, CO-VEST HAD NO NEED 
TO AVOID THE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BY 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
Defendants argue in·Point II of their Brief that 
Co-Vest failed to avoid the accord and satisfaction by clear 
and convincing evidence. However, defendants' argument 
presupposes that a val id accord and satisfaction has been 
established. 
The party alleging accord and satisfaction is 
required to meet the burden of proof as to every necessary 
element. Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 615 P.2d 
1276 (Utah, 1980). The lower Court, presented with the 
evidence of both Co-vest and defendants, concluded that 
defendants did not meet their burden of proof in 
establishing an accord and satisfaction. Since defendants 
failed in the first instance to establish an accord and 
'atisfaction, Co-Vest had no burden of presenting any 
evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, to avoid 
l he accord and satisfaction. Defendants' argument, 





An agreement was 
final payment on 
clear and convincing evidence is 
CONCLUSION 
obtained a Judgment against 
entered whereby defendants 
the Judgment for one year. 
defendants. 
might defer 
De fend ants 
thereafter failed to pay the remaining amount owing upon the 
agreed date. Co-Vest executed upon and initiated 
Sheriff's Sale of defendants' property. As an accommodation 
to defendants, Co-Vest cancelled the Sheriff's Sale and 
released from the Judgment Lien some of defendants' property 
to enable defendants to pay off the Judgment. Defendants 
attempted to show that such arrangement effected an accord 
and satisfaction. Defendants failed to carry their burden 
of proof in establishing the accord and satisfaction and the 
District Court ruled against them and in favor of Co-Vest. 
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Respondent Co-Vest requests that the ruling of the District 
Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this 12th day of December, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
- Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, postage prepaid, this 12th day of 
December, 1983, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Respondent's Brief on this 12th day of December, 1983, to 
the following: 
John Burton Anderson, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants - Appellants 
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